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Comments and Casenotes
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE FOR FRAUD AS TO
MATTERS RELATED TO PRE-MARITAL
UNCHASTITY
Behr v. Behr1
Baldwin v. Baldwin
2
In the first principal case the spouses were married on
October 10, 1941, and the wife gave birth to a (premature)
child on January 4, 1942. The child lived. The wife had
informed the husband of her being pregnant at least as
early as late October and they had together visited a doc-
tor on November 14. There was a conflict of testimony
as to what went on at the doctor's office. The husband
testified that the doctor had made some equivocal remark
about their waiting so long, which he, the husband, did
not understand. The doctor testified that he had discussed
with the husband the fact that the wife was four or five
months pregnant, and that he had fixed the probable date
of birth as March 10, 1942. The husband continued marital
relations with the wife after this, for at least a month.
Immediately after the birth of the child the spouses sepa-
rated and the husband filed a bill for annulment for fraud,
alleging that the wife had fraudulently concealed from
him at the time of the marriage the fact that she was then
pregnant by another man. At the trial the husband testi-
fied that he had first met the wife on July 27, 1941, had
had no sexual relations with her until after they were
married, and was unaware at that time that she was then
pregnant. The wife testified that they had first met on
June 27, 1941, that they had had sexual relations on that
date, and that she had advised the husband of her preg-
nancy before they were married. The trial court denied
the annulment on the ground that, regardless of the pater-
1 30 A. (2d) 750 (Md., 1943). The statement of facts of this case used
in the present casenote is taken both from the Court of Appeals opinion
and from the appellate record, No. 12, January Term, 1943.
2No. 1898 Divorces, Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, Maryland;
decree of annulment, November 24, 1941. The statement of facts of this
case used in the present casenote is taken from the bill of complaint and
from the uncontradicted testimony of witnesses called by the plaintiff.
There was no opinion filed in the case and no appeal was taken.
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nity of the child, the husband had ratified the marriage
("condoned" )3 by his continued relations with the wife after
becoming aware of the advanced state of her pregnancy.
The Court of Appeals affirmed on the same ground, with-
out finding it necessary to go into the detail of the law as
to when concealment of pregnancy is an aftionable fraud,
although by dictum it was suggested that, but for the rati-
fication, the particular fraud would have been actionable,
at least had there been no pre-marital relations between
the spouses.
In the second principal case the plaintiff husband mar-
ried the defendant wife, and they immediately set up
housekeeping together in an apartment. There had been
no pre-marital relations. Eighteen days after the mar-
riage the defendant wife brought a child to the apartment
and disclosed to the husband that it was her illegitimate
child, aged seven. The husband had had no previous
knowledge of the child's existence. Upon learning of the
fact that the wife had borne such a child, the husband
refrained from further marital relations and sued for an-
nulment of the marriage for the wife's fraud in conceal-
ing from him the fact of her having had the illegitimate
child. Upon proof of the allegations, without contest by
the defendant, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County
granted the annulment, without opinion. There was no
appeal. I
These two cases involve an area of Maryland domestic
relations law, which, up to recently, had no occasion to
be treated directly in judicial decision, but which now,
because of a recent statutory change, will inevitably be
brought more sharply into focus. This is the problem of
whether marriages may be annulled for fraudulent mis-
representations as to or concealment of matters related
to the pre-marital unchastity of the defendant wife, over
and above the fact of her mere pre-marital unchastity
alone. Prior to 1939 it was unnecessary to deal with ques-
tions of matters related to pre-marital unchastity at the
level of fraud as an impediment to marriage, for the reason
' Both the trial court and the appellate opinion in the Behr case used the
word "condoned" as descriptive of the husband's having ratified the mar-
riage. "Ratified" is a word more generally used for all the various impedi-
ments to marriage which permit of their being waived by the one en-
titled to assert them. Condonation more usually refers to the plaintiff's
forgiveness of the defendant's having committed supervenient grounds for
divorce. On annulment and ratification, see Strahorn, Void and Voidable
Marriages in Maryland and Their Annulment (1938) 2 Md. L. Rev. 211,
212, 238.
1943]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
that the pre-marital unchastity of the wife, by itself, and
regardless of extrinsic complications, if unknown to the
husband at the time of marriage, was itself a ground for
divorce in favor of the husband under the former Maryland
law.' Thus, all questions of fraud as to extrinsic matters
related to unchastity merged in the latter ground for
divorce, and so it was that no law had occasion to develop
as to the related matters alone as themselves frauds.
But, the 1939 Legislature completely repealed the pre-
marital unchastity ground for divorce, and so it is that
questions of fraud as to such matters can no longer be
resolved under the divorce ground, but now they must be
litigated as for fraud leading to annulment, if at all.5
It could be argued, of course, both from the legislative
policy implicit in the repealer, and from a dictum in a
Maryland case6 under the divorce ground while it existed,
that the wife's simple concealment of the fact of her pre-
marital unchastity with another man, without more, should
not itself now be a ground for annulment for fraud. The
question remains, however, what of the misrepresentation
as to, or the concealment of more serious and more material
facts, growing out of and related to the fact of pre-marital
unchastity? Will they, nevertheless, be held grounds for
annulment, even though the simple unchastity is not?
Will, for that matter, a distinction be observed between
a positive misrepresentation by giving a lying answer to
a specific question or by volunteering false positive state-
ments, on the one hand, and merely concealing the truth,
on the other? In a borderline case, of course, the differ-
ence in weight between these might throw the balance
the one way or the other. Deliberate lying, whether in
answer to question or by volunteered information, makes
the wife out to be a less savory character than when she
merely keeps silence. Then, too, the husband has more
claim that the point is a material one to him if he has
interrogated her, or has proceeded on her volunteered in-
formation, than when nothing is said by either about the
matter.
' Md. Code (1924) Art. 16, Sec. 38, as amended by Md. Laws 1939, Ch.
558.
5 There is no statutory authority in Maryland for annulment of mar-
riages for fraud, but the Maryland Court has asserted such power as an
incident of the jurisdiction of Equity over contracts thus affected, LeBrun
v. LeBrun, 55 Md. 496 (1881).
6 "In the absence of such a statute it is clear that the incontinence of
a wife before marriage, though unknown to the husband, would ordinarily
not justify a decree of divorce on that ground." Hoff v. Hoff, 162 Md.
248, 251, 159 A. 591, 82 A. L. R. 528 (1932).
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Three principal problems of matters related to the pre-
marital unchastity of the wife seem to suggest themselves.
First, raised by one aspect of the first principal case, what
of the wife's being pregnant by another man at the time
of the marriage, the fact of her pregnancy being unknown
to the husband; second, what of other aggravated aspects
of the wife's pre-marital unchastity, including, as was in-
volved in the second principal case, her having borne a
child by another man, this unknown to the husband; third,
also suggested by the first principal case, what of fraudu-
lent representations by the wife as to the consequences
of illicit relations between her and the husband, such as
by falsely stating that she has become pregnant or has
borne a child by him when, in fact, she either became preg-
nant by another man or did not so become at all? A fourth
problem to be discussed is that directly involved in the
actual decision of the first principal case, i. e., ratification
of a fraud of this type which is otherwise actionable.
II
The first type problem, concealment of pregnancy by
another man at the time of marriage, is suggested by the
Behr case. As the case was decided, of course, the point
was not directly involved, for the Court found a ratification,
even if there had been an otherwise actionable fraud. But,
had there been no ratification, and had the Court chosen
to believe plaintiff's testimony (contradicted by defend-
ant) that there had been no pre-marital relations, and that
he was unaware of her pregnancy, then the question would
have been most directly presented whether concealment
of pregnancy by another man is an actionable fraud. A
dictum in the Behr case suggests that such fraud is action-
able."
Over and above the fact that several states make preg-
nancy by another, unknown to the husband, a statutory
ground for divorce,8 there is considerable case law in other
states to the same effect, as a matter of annulment for
fraud, following the leading Massachusetts case of Rey-
"Here, the Court may assume to be true the husband's allegation that
at the time of his marriage the wife concealed from him the fact that she
was then pregnant, and also that he bad not previously had intercourse
with her,-thus stating a case for annulment for fraud . . 21
SII VERNIER, AMEwcAN FAMILY LAWS (1932, 1938) Sec. 73, indicates
that fourteen states have such a ground for divorce, so called. While, in
substance, this amounts to annulment for a ground existing at the time of
marriage, yet it is called divorce, and is analogous to the Maryland di-
vorce grounds (impotence, marriage void ab initio) which also accomplish
annulment under the name of divorce.
19431
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nolds v. Reynolds.9 The grounds usually assigned to sup-
port the holding that this is a fraudulent concealment of
a fact material to the marriage relation are that, when
pregnant by another, the wife is pro tern. incapable of
bearing a child of the husband's; that for a briefer period
she may be incapable of having marital relations with
him; and that, if the marriage be not annulled, the pre-
sumption of legitimacy (difficult to rebut) will cause the
husband to be regarded as the father of a child really
another's, with all the legal and social consequences inci-
dent thereto.
All of these arguments, of course, tend to make it out
that pregnancy by another at time of marriage, unknown
to husband, is a fact material to the marriage relation, the
concealment of which should be an actionable fraud, even
though concealment of mere unchastity itself might not
be so actionable. The cases are clear to the effect that the
husband is entitled to an annulment for concealment of
pregnancy by another when he, himself, has not had illicit
pre-marital relations with the wife."° On the other hand,
all the cases found in other jurisdictions on this matter
deny the annulment where the husband has had pre-mari-
tal relations with the wife." This is particularly puzzling
when there are considered the cases listed herein farther
along 12 on the question whether to grant the husband an
annulment where the wife falsely claims to have become
pregnant by the husband when, in fact, she had become
pregnant by another. Those cases are divided on the point
and quite a few respectable jurisdictions grant the annul-
ment in the latter situation.' 8
03 Allen 605 (Mass., 1862). The Reynolds case rejected the contrary
English view of Moss v. Moss (1897) Prob. 263. The Moss case was also
rejected in Brown v. Scott, 140 Md. 258, 117 A. 114, 22 A. L. R. 810 (1922).
10 Allen's Appeal, 99 Pa. 196, 44 A. R. 101 (1888); Baker v. Baker, 13
Cal. 87 (1859) ; Carris v. Carris, 24 N. J. E. 516 (1873) ; Donovan v. Dono-
van, 9 Allen 140 (Mass., 1864) ; Fontana v. Fontana, 77 Misc. 28, 135 N. Y.
S. 220 (1912); Hardesty v. Hardesty, 193 Cal. 330, 223 P. 951 (1924);
Harrell v. Harrell, 42 S. W. 1040 (Tex., 1897) ; Harrison v. Harrison, 94
Mich. 55, 54 N. W. 275, 34 A. S. R. 364 (1893) ; Nadra v. Nadra, 79 Mich.
591, 44 N. W. 1046 (1890) ; Sinclair v. Sinclair, 57 N. J. U. 222, 40 A. 679
(1898).
11 Crehore v. Crehore, 97 Mass. 330 (1867); Scroggins v. Scroggins, 14
N. C. 429 (1832); Seilheimer v. Seilheimer, 40 N. J. E. 412, 2 A. 376
(1885) ; Westfall v. Westfall, 100 Ore. 224, 197 P. 271, 13 A. L. R. 1428
(1921); Long v. Long, 77 N. C. 304, 24 A. S. R. 449.
12 Infra,.n. 29.
13 Perhaps the explanation of the seeming paradox may be that the con-
cealment of pregnancy cases involve mere concealment without any posi-
tive statement, where those involving fraudulent misrepresentation as to
cause of disclosed pregnancy involve the wife's having actually made
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Be that as it may, several considerations suggest that
it would be plausible for the Maryland Court to deny relief,
at least for the immediate ground of concealment of preg-
nancy, where there had been pre-marital relations, while
granting it for that reason if there had been none. One
reason is the local rule that the burden of proof of fraud
affecting a marriage is unusually high when there have
been pre-marital relations between the parties, a rule hold-
ing, in effect, that "if the parties ought to be married they
stay married!"' 4  Another is the analogy to the rule of
Hoff v. Hoff which, while pre-marital unchastity alone was
still a ground for divorce, denied such relief to a husband
who claimed it because of the wife's relations with another
man where he, himself, had had pre-marital relations with
her.15 A third consideration is the relative factual diffi-
culty of proving that the child is another's, not the hus-
band's, when the husband himself has had pre-marital
relations. All this would seem to be borne out by dicta
in the Behr case. One of these analogizes the matter to
the rulings under the now extinct pre-marital unchastity
ground for divorce, and specifically cites the Hebb 6 and
Hoff cases, the former of which required the husband to
show the absence of facts which should have put him on
guard. The other dictum includes the absence of pre-
marital relations among those facts stated abstractly to
make out a case "for annulment for fraud" where there is
no ratification.17
This latter problem, of course, approaches the third
type of fraud set out, fraudulent representation as to being
pregnant, or as to being pregnant by plaintiff when preg-
nant by another. But, it might be argued, a person who
is told his prospective wife is pregnant should take a
a positively false statement relied on by the husband. It was suggested
in the text above that the latter involved a more serious fraud than mere
concealment.
", The rule of the strict burden of proof where there have been illicit
relations between the parties has been stated in Wimbrough v. Wim-
brough, 125 Md. 619, 94 A. 168, Ann. Cas. 1916h, 920 (1915) ; Owings v.
Owings, 141 Md. 416, 118 A. 858 (1922) ; Montgomery v. U'Nertle, 143 Md.
200, 122 A. 357 (1923) ; and Lurz v. Lurz, 170 Md. 428, 184 A. 906, 185 A.
676 (1936).
15 Hoff v. Hoff, 162 Md. 248, 159 A. 591, 82 A. L. R. 528 (1932). A dictum
in the Hoff case, 162 Md. 248, recognized a line of out of State cases to
the effect that the plaintiff husband's own pre-marital relations with the
wife would even preclude him from having the marriage annulled for her
fraudulent concealment of being pregnant or her fraudulent representation
that he was responsible for the pregnancy when another actually was.
11 Hebb v. Hebb, 135 Md. 697, 111 A. 240 (1919). In addition, on the
now repealed pre-marital unchastity ground for divorce, see Wiegand v.
Wiegand, 155 Md. 643, 142 A. 188 (1928).
17'Supra, n. 7.
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greater risk either of the truth of that statement, or of
his own causation thereof if she is, than should one who
marries a woman believed by him not to be pregnant at
all and who then (finds out that she is.
It is certainly arguable that concealment of actual preg-
nancy by another, even where there have been pre-marital
relations, is more of a serious fraud than false pretense
of being pregnant, perhaps even more than false pretense
of being the cause of disclosed actual pregnancy, which
problems will be discussed later.
III
We now deal with other types of aggravated versions
of pre-marital unchastity, first, that involved in the Bald-
win case now under review, the wife's having given birth
to a child as a result of her previous unchastity, this un-
known to the husband. There will also be discussed under
this heading such further types of aggravation of pre-
marital unchastity as suggest themselves.
Cutting across this problem, like the former one, is the
question: Will a husband as readily be entitled to an annul-
ment where there have been pre-marital relations between
him and the .wife as where there have not? The discussion
in the heading above, including the dictum of the Behr
case analogizing the matter to the rule under the extinct
divorce ground, would seem to indicate that annulments
for these reasons either will not be granted at all, or if
so, not so readily, where there have been illicit relations
between the parties themselves. Hence, the problems will
be discussed on the basis of the husband's not having in-
dulged in pre-marital relations with the wife himself.
There had been no pre-marital relations between the
parties in the Baldwin case.
Factually, the wife's having borne an illegitimate child
as a result of illicit relations with another is not so much
different from the previous problem of her currently being
pregnant by another when married. But the impact on
the husband is somewhat different, and the arguments
pro and con likewise differ. For that matter, the parallel
problem arises, suppose the wife conceals having borne
a child by a previous marriage, as distinguished from hav-
ing had one by previous illicit relations?
As a relative matter, it would seem more of a fraud
if the child of the earlier union be illegitimate, as in the
principal Baldwin case where the annulment was granted,
than legitimate, for if illegitimate the concealment also
[VOL. VII
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involves a greater element of bad character on the part
of the wife, not present when the birth of the child came
in lawful wedlock. There is more to the situation than
in the case of mere unchastity, which by itself is not usually
manifested to the whole world. But that does happen
when there has been birth of child resultant.18
Regardless of the legitimacy of the concealed child,
there are not available exactly the same arguments for
annulment as can be mustered for concealment of extant
pregnancy, viz., of incapacity to bear the husband's child
or to have marital relations with him, and of the pre-
sumptive paternity of another's child.
But, other things equal, it would seem that the Baldwin
case is right and that the wife's concealment of having
given birth to a child still in her custody, particularly
where illegitimate, can be regarded as sufficiently serious
and deleterious to relations between the spouses as to en-
title the husband to an annulment. While the husband
is not legally chargeable with the support of the wife's
child, yet, as a practical matter, the child will be on his
hands, so long as it is of such a tender age as to need the
mother's care. Whereas the husband may have anticipated
living with his wife, for the time being at least, without
further family, he finds himself saddled with a step-child
which must live in his home for want of a better place.
He has to face dividing his wife's affection with a child
of tender years needful of her care and attention. Among
his associates he may well have the alternative of being
regarded as the child's father, of disclosing his wife's
shame, or of pretending her prior marriage.
It might be different if the child, particularly where
legitimate and resulting from a marriage itself possibly
concealed, were grown, or were established in some other
custody than that of the mother. In such a case there
would not be the element of the husband's having to cope
with the child's presence in his home, which is the essence
of the fraud on the husband in the Baldwin case.
18 Contrast cases where the defendant wife tells her prospective husband
of the fact that she has a child, but represents it as being a legitimate
child, when it is not. In Domschke v. Domschke, 139 App. Div. 454, 122
N. Y. S. 892 (1910), the husband was granted an annulment in that situa-
tion. Contra: Farr v. Farr, 2 MacArthur 35 (D. C., 1878). In Bahren-
burg v. Bahrenburg, 88 Misc. 272, 150 N. Y. S. 589, the annulment was
denied, but the plaintiff had had pre-marital relations with the wife, was
aware of other acts of unchastity on her part, and made no attempt to
verify her statement as to the time and place of her alleged marriage to
the child's father.
1943]
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What if the child be legitimate? It is doubtful if the con-
cealment of a prior lawful marriage alone would be held
in Maryland an actionable fraud. This is particularly so
under the Oswald case,19 which held, even as to a Roman
Catholic husband, that the wife's pretense of being a widow
when she was really divorced did not work an actionable
fraud on the husband. By the same token, pretending to
be single, when really widowed or divorced would also
not be an actionable fraud.20
We might generalize from the Baldwin case to the effect
that it recognizes that, while pre-marital unchastity alone,
merely concealed from the husband may not be a sufficient
ground for annulment for fraud, yet when that and aggra-
vating factors are present, then, in a strong enough case,
an actionable fraud occurs. The aggravating factors pres-
ent are having borne an illegitimate child, thus advertising
to the world the pre-marital unchastity, and having the
child still in the wife's custody to annoy the husband by
its presence in the home.
The closest analogy to this in the case law of another
state is the Wemple case2 1 which also recognized an aggra-
vated version of pre-marital unchastity as sufficient to
entitle to an annulment for fraud, even though simple
unchastity would not have sufficed. There the defendant
wife, to the knowledge of the plaintiff husband, had been
openly living with another man as man and wife. She
pretended to the plaintiff that she had been divorced from
her former "husband" and the plaintiff thereupon married
her. Actually, the defendant had never been lawfully
married at all to the former "husband", and they had
merely separated from their illicit union. The Minnesota
court granted the annulment and stressed the humiliation
which the plaintiff would otherwise suffer in being forced
to continue living with the wife after discovering the illicit
nature of her former union believed to have been lawful.
So, in the Baldwin case, it could be said that the plaintiff
would suffer humiliation from having to live with a wife
who manifests to the world her shame through the illegi-
timate fruit of her misconduct, present in the plaintiff's
home to remind him and his associates of her past.22
19 Oswald v. Oswald, 146 Md. 313, 126 A. 81 (1924).
20 As in Trask v. Trask, 114 Me. 60, 95 A. 352 (1915), where the wife
pretended to be a spinster and virtuous, when actually she had been mar-
ried and had been divorced for adultery. The court denied the husband
an annulment.
21 Wemple v. Wemple, 170 Minn. 305, 212 N. W. 808 (1927).
22 Consider that the Maryland Court granted annulments in Brown v.
Scott, 140 Md. 258, 117 A. 114, 22 A. L. R. 810 (1922); and Corder v.
[VOL. VII
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Furthermore, other state courts have recognized other
types of aggravations of pre-marital unchastity as sufficient
to entitle to annulment, even though simple unchastity
merely concealed would not have entitled. Thus, in a
situation where the husband had specifically interrogated
the wife about her virtue, and insisted on the point, the
annulment was granted."3 Here again there is more than
mere concealment of unchastity.24
It is not so much having once had a child, or having
once been unchaste, as it is the fact of the illicit union
which produced the child and the probable presence of
the child in the couple's home, unanticipated by the hus-
band, that make the Baldwin case plausible in granting an
annulment. If either the child had been legitimate, or
if it had been grown or in other custody than the mother's25
the fraud would have been less serious, possibly not enough
to entitle to annulment. But, all things considered (as
they have to be in fraud cases), the situation was suffi-
ciently material to the plaintiff to entitle him to relief.26
IV
The third type of problem as herein outlined is sug-
gested by the husband's alternative contention in the Behr
case. This was to the effect that, assuming the truth of
the wife's testimony that there had been pre-marital rela-
tions and that she had disclosed her pregnancy to him
Corder, 141 Md. 114, 117 A. 119 (1922), in both of which an important
element in the fraud practiced on the plaintiffs was the concealment by the
defendants of the facts of previous bad character.
23 Gatto v. Gatto, 79 N. H. 177, 106 A. 493 (1919), where the husband
was granted an annulment where he told the wife before marriage that
he insisted upon her being chaste and she represented that she was.
Actually, she had committed incest with her father for a number of years.
21 Consider also Entsminger v. Entsminger, 99 Kan. 362, 161 P. 607
(1916), where the husband, aged and mentally weak at the time of the
marriage, was granted an annulment where the wife, who had represented
herself as being virtuous, actually had conducted a bawdy house for a
number of years.
25 In Smith v. Smith, 8 Ore. 100 (1879), the annulment was denied the
husband where the illegitimate child had been born some time before, and
there was no mention of its still being in the mother's custody. In Shadry
v. Logan, 17 Misc. 329, 40 N. Y. S. 1010 (1896), the annulment was denied
where the husband claimed it on the ground of concealment of illegitimate
child, but the court indicated that the plaintiff knew of the birth of the
child at the time of the marriage.
26 Incidentally involved on the point of fraudulent concealment of aggra-
vated aspects of pre-marital unchastity is the defendant's concealing the
fact of being infected with a venereal disease. Typical of the cases grant-
ing annulments for this ground are: Anonymous, 21 Misc. 765, 49 N. Y. S.
331 (1897) ; C. v. C., 158 Wisc. 301, 148 N. W. 865 (1914) ; Smith v. Smith,
171 Mass. 404, 50 N. E. 933, 41 L. R. A. 800, 68 A. S. R. 440 (1898); and
Svenson v. Svenson, 178 N. Y. 54, 70 N. E. 120 (1904).
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prior to the marriage, nevertheless the date of their first
meeting (as claimed by him) and the date of the child's
birth both indicated that the pregnancy had resulted from
her previous relations with another man not known to the
husband at the time of the marriage, so that her fraudulent
pretense that pregnancy had resulted from relations with
him entitled him to an annulment.
Generalized, the problem is this: May an annulment be
granted where, there having been pre-marital relations
between the spouses, the wife induces the husband to
marry her by falsly pretending that she has become preg-
nant from their relations, or has earlier borne a child
resulting therefrom, when, in fact, she became pregnant
from relations with another man, unknown to the husband,
or did not even become pregnant at all.
As mentioned above, in connection with treatment of
the analogous subsidiary problem of concealment of actual
pregnancy, several considerations suggest that this type
of fraud is the weakest and least likely to be held action-
able. The Maryland Court's reluctance to grant relief
for otherwise actionable fraud where there have been
illicit relations between the parties might indicate even
greater reluctance to grant it for a fraud concerning those
very relations themselves.
The high burden of proof resulting from pre-marital
relations and the tenor of the Hoff case both would affect
all the subsidiary situations in the third group. The factual
difficulty of determining whose intercourse was the cause
of pregnancy would bear on the particular subsidiary type,
fraud as to being the cause of actual pregnancy. 7 It is
not so clear, however, burden of proof and factual diffi-
culties surmounted, which of the two subsidiary types
(false pretense of causation of actual pregnancy, or false
" An example of how modern science can contribute to the problem of
disproving paternity, even though intercourse occurred, is seen in Anderson
v. Anderson, Baltimore Daily Record, November 2, 1942 (Circuit Court,
Cook County, Illinois). There the plaintiff husband, prior to marriage,
bad had intercourse with the defendant wife on but one occasion, at which
time a contraceptive device was used. She persuaded him that she had
become pregnant therefrom and induced him to marry her. The child was
born eight months after the time of the intercourse. He sued for annul-
ment, claiming the child was not his. The court ordered blood tests to be
taken, from which the doctors testified that he could not be the father
of the child, and the court granted the annulment.
The only specific authority in Maryland for the use of blood tests in
court on paternity issues is found in Md. Laws 1941, Cb. 307, adding Md.
Code (1939) Art. 12, Sec. 17 permitting their use in criminal bastardy
proceedings. There is no precedent for their use in Maryland in civil an-
nulment proceedings, although the Chicago case Indicates the desirability
of their being used.
[VOL. VII
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pretense of becoming pregnant) is, as a relative matter,
the greater or the lesser fraud.
On the first point (fraudulent representation that plain-
tiff is responsible for pregnancy when another actually
is), about twice as many jurisdictions grant the annulment
as refuse it for this type of fraud.2" On the other hand,
as pointed out above, there is the paradoxical proposition
that the few jurisdictions that have passed on it are prac-
tically unanimous in refusing the annulment for conceal-
ment of pregnancy by another when there have been pre-
marital relations between the parties.29
Somewhat a similar paradox is presented by contrasting
the cases involving the second subsidiary type of fraud
now being discussed, i. e., fraudulent pretense of having
become pregnant from illicit relations. For only one case
has been located granting the annulment for that reason,
and all the others have denied it. 30 But that one case
is the well known New York Court of Appeals case of
DiLorenzo v. DiLorenzo,3' itself cited with approval by the
Maryland Court in Brown v. Scott.32  This might indicate
that the Maryland Court might go along with it, despite
the implications of the dicta in the Behr case, and the
analogy to the Hoff case rule.
The DiLorenzo case granted an annulment to the hus-
band who was induced to marry the wife by her false
28 Granting the annulment: Barden v. Barden, 14 N. C. 436 (1832);
Winner v. Winner, 171 Wisc. 413, 177 N. W. 680, 11 A. L. R. 919 (1920);
Wallace v. Wallace, 137 Ia. 37, 114 N. W. 527, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 544, 126
A. S. R. 253, 15 Ann. Cas. 761 (1908); Sissung v. Sissung, 65 Mich. 168,
31 N. W. 770 (1887) ; Scott v. Shufeldt, 5 Paige 43 (N. Y., 1835) ; Ritayik
v. Ritayik, 202 Mo. App. 74, 213 S. W. 883 (1919) ; Lyman v. Lyman, 90
Conn. 399, 97 A. 312, L. R. A. 1916E, 643 (1916) ; Jackson v. Ruby, 120 Me.
391, 115 A. 90, 19 A. L. R. 77 (1921) ; and Gard v. Gard, 204 Mich. 255, 169
N. W. 908, 11 A. L. R. 923 (1918).
Denying the annulment: Arno v. Arno, 265 Mass. 282, 163 N. E. 861
(1928); Foss v. Foss, 12 Allen 26 (Mass., 1866); Franke v. Franke, 3 Cal.
Unrep. 656, 31 P. 571, 18 L. R. A. 375 (1892); States v. States, 37 N. J. E.
195 (1883); Safford v. Safford, 224 Mass. 392, 113 N. E. 181, L. R. A.
1916F, 526 (1916) ; and Helfrick v. Helfrick, 246 Il1. App. 294 (1927).29 Supra, n. 11.
"0Tait v. Tait, 3 Misc. 218, 23 N. Y. S. 597 (1893); Bryant v. Bryant,
171 N. C. 746, 88 S. E. 147 (1916) ; Mason v. Mason, 164 Ark. 59, 261 S. W.
40 (1924) ; Donovan v. Donovan, 147 Misc. 137, 263 N. Y. S. 336 (1933) ;
Fairchild v. Fairchild, 43 N. J. E. 477, 11 A. 426 (1887); Todd v. Todd,
149 Pa. 60, 24 A. 128, 17 L. R. A. 320 (1892) ; Young v. Young, 127 S. W.
898 (Tex. C. A., 1910) ; Gondouin v. Gondouin, 14 Cal. App. 285, 111 P. 756
(1910).
31174 N. Y. 467, 67 N. E. 63, 63 L. R. A. 92, 95 A. S. R. 609 (1903).
Another (lower) New York case, Gordon v. Gordon, 232 N. Y. S. 541
(1921), reversed the dismissal of the complaint and directed an annulment
where plaintiff had been induced to marry by defendant's false representa-
tion that she was pregnant by him, but there was only a memorandum
opinion in the Appellate Division.
32 Supra, n. 22.
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representations that, during his absence from the state,
she had borne a child as a result of their illicit relations
when, in fact, she had borne no child at all.
It would seem impossible to distinguish the particular
facts, false representation of having borne a child, from
the more typical situation forming the basis of the instant
treatment, false representation of having become preg-
nant, so that the DiLorenzo case can be stated as dia-
metrically opposed to the other cases denying relief for
false statements of having become pregnant. For the only
difference on the facts is that in the DiLorenzo case she
represented falsely that she had borne a child, and in the
others each wife falsely represented that she was about
to bear such a child.
It is hard to see much difference in materiality between
the two respective statements. And, for that matter, we
might say that the husband who marries in belief of exist-
ing pregnancy has more even to commend him to the court
than the one who marries in belief of a child already having
been born. The former is doing, relatively, the more hon-
orable thing, in that he thinks he is making it possible
for the child to be born originally legitimate, where the
latter thinks he is merely retroactively undoing a once
achieved illegitimacy.
An important consideration that may have been too
much overlooked on this problem, of whether to grant an-
nulments where the plaintiff husband himself had pre-
marital relations with the wife, is the social policy of
encouraging such husbands to marry when pregnancy has
resulted from such relations. If the law is too strict in
denying annulments where the fraud would otherwise
be actionable but for the fact of pre-marital relations, this
may tend to discourage men who otherwise would do the
honorable thing and marry when informed of resulting
pregnancy. On the other hand, if the man can safely rely
on the woman's representations, and feel that he can obtain
an annulment if they turn out to be false, then more men
may be inclined to marry when pregnancy actually results
and they are so informed. The law must not frustrate its
own purposes by the over-application of the "if they ought
to be married, they stay married" philosophy which, as
we have seen, underlies the rule of the strict burden of
proof and that of the Hoff case.
By such reasoning, it is submitted that it is the better
rule, other things equal, to grant annulments for otherwise
actionable fraud, even where the parties have had pre-
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marital relations, be this for concealment of pregnancy,
misrepresentation as to cause of actual pregnancy, or false
pretense of becoming pregnant or having borne a child.
The man's having done the honorable thing should have
some significance in neutralizing the equity to his disfavor
resulting from his having violated social conventions about
extra-marital sexual relations.
V
Finally, there is the question of ratification of what
otherwise would be an actionable fraud, which point was
the really decisive one in the Behr case. There was no
question at all as to this in the Baldwin case, for there the
husband immediately refrained from further relations with
his wife upon learning of her illegitimate child, and
brought suit ten days thereafter.
With fraud, as with the other "contract impediments"
of lack of intention, insanity, intoxication, and duress,
ratification of the marriage by the complainant will pre-
clude obtaining an annulment even though otherwise there
is a case for it. Typically, of course, ratification may be
made by continuing marital relations, with knowledge of
the fraud practiced, or in a sober, or lucid interval, or after
duress removed, as the case may be. No doubt, there can
be an express ratification without marital relations.
Laches, too, may be a bar, if serious enough . 3 In fact,
it is usually stated that.there must be a timely application
for relief for these particular grounds for annulment, as
well as a prompt disavowal of the marriage.
No doubt the Behr case was eminently sound in putting
the denial of the annulment on ratification, at least if the
husband's testimony that there were no pre-marital rela-
tions is to be taken as true, as against him for purposes
of evaluating other testimony as to extrinsic facts bearing
on ratification. For even in the most favorable light as
to him, what he testified to as to what was said at the
doctor's office, and his personal observation of his wife
past at least six months pregnancy, 3  during which time
he continued relations with her, all should have served to
83 Consider the discussion of laches in the majority and dissenting opin-
ions in Lurz v. Lurz, 8upra, n. 14, noted (1937) 1 Md. L. Rev. 348.
", The Court's opinion mentioned that a photograph of the wife, taken
shortly after the marriage, disclosed her obvious advanced state of preg-
nancy at that time. The photograph had been introduced in evidence,
was exhibited to the Court of Appeals in argument, but had been deleted
from the appellate record by agreement.
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put him on notice that her pregnancy ante-dated his mar-
riage to her and consequently must have resulted from
relations with another man, if he himself, as he testified,
had not had pre-marital relations with her. Thus, his con-
tinued relations with notice that her pregnancy ante-dated
the marriage precluded him from seeking annulment for
fraud in concealing it, if she did conceal it.
Furthermore, the doctor testified that he told the hus-
band in November that the wife was four or five months
pregnant, and that the probable birth date was March 10;
the wife reiterated this latter fact to him (although the
husband claimed there was discussion between them to
the effect it was a mistake); and a hospital room was
reserved for then. These facts merely drive the point
home, if the legal basis be concealment of pregnancy and
no pre-marital relations, that he continued relations with
her in awareness either of the fact that her pregnancy ante-
dated the marriage, or of facts that should have put a rea-
sonable man on notice thereof.
On the other hand, if we ignore his claim by testimony
that there were no pre-marital relations, and accept as
true the wife's testimony that they did occur, and that she
told him of her pregnancy, then (aside from the factual
difficulty of determining whether the conception of the
child resulted from relations with the husband or with
another) the case is not so strong for a ratification by the
husband by continuing relations. For then it could be
argued, as it was in appellant's brief, that plaintiff con-
tinued marital relations believing the unborn child to be
his, and desisted as soon as he was convinced, from the
date of the birth, that it was not his. But then the question
arises, was it his or another's? From June 27 (the earliest
date as to which there was any testimony as to intercourse)
to January 4 is six months and eight days, and there was
medical testimony that a child born at that period would
hardly have lived, although the wife's child did live. But
still, the time is so close that the annulment could plausibly
be denied on the ground the plaintiff had not sustained
the burden of showing the child to have been conceived
from relations with another man prior to June 27.
The Court apparently chose to believe either all the
plaintiff's testimony or all the defendant's, rather than
some but not all of each. To believe all the plaintiff's,
including lack of pre-marital relations, made ratification
the obvious answer. To believe all the defendant's includ-
ing date of first meeting and sexual relations then, would
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have made it impossible for plaintiff sufficiently clearly to
show conception from relations with another man.
On the other hand, granting it would have been possible
to prove that conception did result from earlier relations
with another man, then it would have been unfair to work
a ratification from continued relations, so long as those
relations were engaged in while plaintiff still believed he
was the father of the unborn child. It is much more plaus-
ible to work a ratification here on the theory of no pre-
marital relations and absolute ignorance of pregnancy at
the time of marriage. On the theory of disclosure of preg-
nancy and claim of plaintiff's responsibility, the case would
be better put on insufficient proof of any other man's
paternity, hence no fraud in the first place.
A plaintiff should not so readily be held to have rati-
fied, merely because he knows some of the facts connected
with his wife's fraud, so long as he is unaware yet that
he has been tricked. For instance, if we grant that, under
the DiLorenzo case, fraudulent pretense as to having be-
come pregnant should be actionable, the following situa-
tion might arise. The wife induces the husband to marry
her by falsely pretending that she is pregnant. In due
course after marriage it is disclosed that she is not preg-
nant. She then falsely assures the husband that she hon-
estly believed that she was pregnant, and, relying on that
assurance, he continues relations with her, but later dis-
covers that she had merely twice tricked him. If he then
disavows further relations, should he not be entitled to
an annulment? Why should not fraud inducing a continu-
ance of relations as much obviate a ratification, as fraud
inducing the marriage should entitle to annulment?
But, of course, the plaintiff in the Behr case had no such
equity in his favor, and stood to lose whether all his
testimony or all his wife's was believed in its entirety.
The Behr case is interesting, however, for furnishing the
basis of discussion of the first and third types of fraud
herein set out, as well as of the ratification point.
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